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Abstract 
Motivation. In recent decades, the use of conditionality backed by benefit sanctions for 
those claiming unemployment and related benefits have become widespread in the welfare 
systems of advanced societies. Governments have increased the intensity and scope of 
sanctions with the aim of encouraging individuals to move off benefits and return to work. 
Existing reviews assessing the effects of sanctions on benefit exits and labour market 
outcomes have found some positive impacts although also variations between studies. 
Evidence from qualitative research has drawn attention to a range of negative 
consequences for individual health and other social outcomes. To our knowledge, the 
quantitative studies on such wider impacts have not been rigorously reviewed.  
Aims and methods. We conduct a scoping review of the existing international evidence on 
labour market and wider impacts of benefit sanctions, in order to systematically assess the 
state of the quantitative literature on this topic. We develop a search strategy based on an 
extended list of terms and synonyms for benefit sanctions. We combine a search of major 
bibliographic databases used across the social and health sciences with a hand search of key 
websites of relevant research and policy organisations. We follow a review protocol to 
extract the information on the main features of each study, including outcome measures 
used, impacts identified and characteristics of target populations. We also examine key 
features of study design and methodologies applied.  
Results. We find a total of 109 studies providing original quantitative evidence on the labour 
market and/or wider impacts of sanctions which meet our other selection criteria (time, 
language, country). Studies from the US make up the largest group by some way, followed 
by Western and Northern European studies. Almost two thirds examined labour market 
outcomes and just one third examined wider impacts; some cover both. While the number 
of studies is slightly lower in recent years, an increasing proportion are using experimental 
or quasi-experimental study designs with stronger claims to identify causal effects. Of the 
studies examining wider impacts, relatively few employ quasi-/experimental designs. The 
picture emerging from the evidence base appears rather fragmented, with inconsistent 
findings reported across the study design types, but this maybe due to the limited evidence 
on the wider impacts. 
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Conclusions. The quantitative evidence on the wider impacts of benefit sanctions is much 
thinner than that on labour market impacts. It is further diluted by being spread across a 
diverse range of outcomes covering adults and their families making it very difficult to draw 
general conclusions in relation to any particular aspect. Methodologically, the literature on 
the wider impacts is dominated by studies with weak study designs. It is difficult to conclude 
that the great bulk of them provide evidence of the causal impact of sanctions and not, for 
example, the impact of unobserved confounding factors. 
Keywords: Benefit sanctions, Social security benefits, Welfare benefits, Unemployment, 
Scoping review. 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, as part of an increasing shift towards active labour market and social 
policies, the use of conditionality backed by benefit sanctions have become widespread in 
the welfare systems of advanced societies (Bonoli 2010; Bonoli and Natali 2012). 
Governments have increased both the intensity and scope of welfare benefit sanctions with 
the aim of encouraging working-age individuals to move off unemployment benefits and 
return to work. Entailing a temporary reduction or interruption of benefit payments, 
sanctions are imposed on claimants who fail to meet specific conditions related to job 
search or work preparation (Griggs and Evans 2010). While initially aimed at people 
unemployed, more recently benefit sanctions have been extended to cover a wider range of 
population groups, including some of those inactive and/or with long-term sickness or 
disability and even, in the UK, those in employment (Baumberg Geiger 2017, Dwyer and 
Wright 2014).  
Existing reviews of quantitative studies assessing the effects of sanctions have focussed on 
the labour market side: on benefit exits and returns to employment. While reported 
outcomes vary between studies, the evidence suggests that sanctions raise benefit exit rates 
and (somewhat weaker) hasten returns to employment, but it also suggests that job quality 
is often poor, that earnings may be lower and that returns to benefits (recidivism) may be 
higher.  
Alongside this, there is a body of largely qualitative research which has drawn attention to a 
range of possible negative consequences of sanctions on a wide range of areas of life. In one 
review, Griggs and Evans (2010) highlight studies examining impacts on claimant financial 
stress, health, propensity to commit crime, and homelessness. In addition, there are impacts 
on household and family relations, including on child development, education and welfare.  
To our knowledge, there has not been a review which has specifically sought to identify 
quantitative studies on wider impacts. Quantitative studies have two key advantages: first 
they can provide some measure of the scale of any impacts and second, with the right 
research design, they can provide evidence that any relationship is caused by the sanction 
event and not by any other factors.  
The present study therefore aims to systematically search for, identify and extract data from 
the existing international quantitative literature on the labour market and wider impacts of 
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benefits sanctions. The working-age population in receipt of unemployment-related or 
other means-tested benefits is the primary focus for this study. We do not apply any 
restrictions on the outcomes studied as the main purpose is to offer a comprehensive 
review of the outcomes reported by relevant studies. 
We do this by conducting a scoping review, broadly in line with the guidelines developed by 
Tricco et al. (2018). A scoping review is intended to capture relevant studies on a topic using 
a systematic search strategy, and study selection and data extraction process. It provides an 
overview of the nature of the evidence base capturing characteristics such as temporal 
and/or geographic spread, nature of research methods or study designs and findings. A 
particular focus here is to establish the nature of the evidence base for wider impacts 
compared with that for labour market outcomes (relative scale, geographic coverage, 
outcomes assessed) and to examine the quality of that evidence.  
1.1 Research questions 
We therefore aim to address the following research questions: 
• What is the nature of the evidence base on the impacts of benefit sanctions, for both 
labour market and wider outcomes? 
• What study designs have been used in studies of benefit sanctions, and how do 
these differ between labour market and wider outcome studies? 
• What is the evidence for the wider impacts of sanctions and how does this evidence 
vary between studies with an experimental or quasi-experimental design and 
others? 
2. Methods 
2.1 Scoping review 
We draw on the seminal framework by Arksey and O’Malley (2005) and more recent 
advances (Levac, Colquhoun, and O’Brien 2010; Peters et al. 2015) to identify and 
systematically synthesise the international evidence from quantitative studies on labour 
market and the wider impacts of benefit sanctions. We developed a protocol for our scoping 
review study (Pattaro et al. 2019) by following, where possible, the Preferred Reporting 
Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) guidelines for scoping reviews 
(Tricco et al. 2018). These are designed to ensure that a rigorous, consistent and transparent 
process is followed. Scoping reviews belong to the broader family of systematic reviews and 
aim to answer broad questions and map the existing body of the literature on a particular 
topic. While valuable in themselves, scoping reviews are also used to inform subsequent 
systematic reviews, as they provide the baseline knowledge which enables researchers to 
establish the need to conduct a full systematic review and meta-analysis on a specific 
research question. 
2.2 Search strategy 
We iteratively developed an extensive search strategy which encompassed a long list of 
subject headings, keywords, terms and synonyms for benefit sanctions. The search strategy 
was developed in consultation with an information officer who is member of the research 
team and has expertise in systematic reviews (VW). Between March and June 2019, we 
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conducted initial electronic searches of eight major bibliographic databases used across the 
social and health sciences: ASSIA, British Education Index, EconLit, ERIC, PsycINFO, MEDLINE, 
Scopus, SocINDEX. Results are summarised in Table A1 with full details of the search 
strategies provided in Table A2 (both in the Appendix). In addition, we conducted hand 
searches of key websites of relevant research and policy organisations (e.g. IZA, NBER, 
RePEc, IFAU, OECD, ILO). The combined results of the searches were imported into Endnote 
and deduplicated. 
2.3 Inclusion criteria and study selection process 
The studies for this review were selected using five inclusion criteria:  
(a) Targeting working-age recipients of welfare- or unemployment-related benefits in 
high-income countries;  
(b) Investigating sanctions applied to these benefits for failure to comply with work 
search or other requirements;  
(c) Quantitative studies based on either experimental, quasi-experimental or non-
experimental designs;  
(d) In English language;  
(e) Published between January 1990 and February 2019. 
The first four authors (SP, NB, EW and MG) conducted the screening and data extraction of 
the studies included in this review. An overview of the study selection process is shown in 
Figure 1. Searching across the eight electronic databases yielded 9629 records. These were 
combined with 401 records retrieved from additional website searches of key research and 
policy organisations. From the combined databases, 2460 (25%) studies were removed 
because they were duplicates, leaving a total of 7570 studies.  
We conducted initial screening based on the assessment of title and abstract to determine 
whether studies appeared to meet our eligibility criteria. This led to exclusion of 6387 (84%) 
studies, because for example the topic of the study was not relevant, their publication date 
was prior January 1990, or they were not published in English. To ensure the reliability of 
initial screening, a preliminary review was conducted on 200 studies. The disagreement rate 
was of 4.5% (n = 9) and discrepancies were solved without resorting to a third-party opinion.  
Initial screening therefore yielded a sample of 1183 full-text articles that were further 
assessed during a second screening. This led to the exclusion of a further 851 studies. The 
majority of these (n = 596; 70%) comprised studies whose focus was not on sanctions. In this 
group there were also studies examining welfare leavers’ outcomes and the effects of other 
welfare reforms such as time limit policies, or job-search interventions not directly reporting 
sanction impacts. Working papers that were subsequently published as a journal article 
which was included in our database were also excluded. An additional 197 studies (23%) 
were excluded due to characteristics pertaining the study design. These included narrative 
papers based on policy analysis, commentaries, discussion pieces, general overviews, 
studies based on qualitative analysis, theoretical studies and studies based on 
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microsimulation modelling. The remaining excluded studies (7%) comprised 27 full-text 
articles that could not be accessed, 21 out-of-scope studies because they were either 
published before January 1990, not in English language or not pertaining to high income 
countries, and 10 studies identified as duplicates at this stage.  
This left a sample of 332 studies which were retained for subsequent data extraction and 
analysis. In this stage of the process, we identified 109 studies (33%) where the authors 
provided original evidence on the impact of benefit sanctions. The analyses in this paper 
focus on this analytical subsample of studies.  
Of the remainder, 147 studies (44%) were found to be based on the assessment of multiple 
simultaneous interventions or policy tools so they did not allow the separate identification 
of the impact of benefit sanctions. These studies were using for example period or policy 
dummy indicators to identify a set of welfare changes or were combining sanctioned 
individuals with groups affected by other policies. These were omitted from further analysis.  
A further 76 studies (23%) reviewed a number of individual studies without providing 
original primary evidence themselves. They used a variety of methodologies from more 
informal narrative reviews to more systematic reviews. These studies were also omitted 
from further analysis at this stage, on the basis that many of the studies they reviewed 
should be captured by our database. At a later stage, we will make a comparison of the 
studies they analysed to see if there are any we can add to our scoping review. Separately, it 
would be interesting to conduct a review of these reviews, to compare the findings to our 
own conclusions.  
2.4 Data extraction 
A data extraction form was developed to record detailed information from the analytical 
subsample of 109 studies. The form was pilot-tested on a randomly selected study and 
subsequently finalised on a larger number of studies to ensure it captured all relevant 
information. The data extraction was carried out in two stages. First, we conducted a partial 
extraction by gathering information on the main characteristics for all the 109 studies 
included in the analytical sample. We then focussed on conducting a full extraction of data 
for those studies reporting wider, non-labour market outcomes. The reasoning behind this 
restriction lies on the fact that there is quite a large body of literature (e.g. Card, Kluve, and 
Weber 2010; 2018; Vooren et al. 2019) which focuses on studies reporting labour market 
and economic outcomes. Little is known on the quality of the evidence base derived from 
those studies which report non-economic outcomes of benefit sanctions. On these, we 
gathered information on study design, data sources and sample size, key outcome and 
exposure measures and main findings. 
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Fig. 1. PRISMA flow chart representing study selection process 
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2.5 Literature analysis and synthesis 
We conduct a descriptive analysis of the evidence base by exploring how this varies by main 
study characteristics. We use this information to identify relevant patterns in the data and 
inform the development of a typology based on the main characteristics of study designs. 
The results emerging from the narrative synthesis based on wider (non-labour market) 
outcomes are then used to reflect on the extent to which study designs are able to support 
causal inference. 
We start with a three-fold typology for study designs based around their ability to support 
causal inferences (Murnane and Willett 2010; Angrist and Pischke 2009). Experimental 
studies have the strongest claims since the researchers work to ensure random allocation to 
intervention and control groups. This includes randomised controlled trials and studies 
based on randomised assignment. Quasi-experimental designs exploit exogenous variation 
occurring ‘naturally’ through the ways in which policy changes have been introduced or 
implemented. This group includes difference-in-differences models, regression discontinuity 
designs and instrumental variables estimation.  
Lastly, there are studies with non-experimental designs which rely, to greater or lesser 
extent, on controlling for differences between sanctioned and non-sanctioned groups using 
observed characteristics which might also influence the outcome of interest. These include 
descriptive studies, simple regression models (Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or logistic 
regression models), along with more advanced regression models such as survival or time-
to-event models, hierarchical or multilevel models, random effects and fixed effects models, 
and time series models. Propensity-score matching and related approaches also belongs to 
this group, as they rely on selection on observables to estimate a propensity score, that is 
the probability of an individual being assigned to an intervention. 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive analysis 
Figure 2 presents the overall distribution of studies reporting both labour market and wider 
outcomes by country and study design (n = 109). By far the largest group, which includes 68 
studies, is for the USA although many of these cover specific locations within the US or a 
group of states, rather than the entire country. When combined with the other non-
European English-speaking countries (Canada and Australia), these account 65% of the 
overall sample. The quality of the evidence base, however, is relatively low with a large 
proportion of studies in the non-experimental group.  
The remaining studies are all European and here the quality of study designs tends to be 
higher. Germany has the highest number of studies (n = 11), followed by other Western 
European countries, such as the Netherlands (n = 8), the United Kingdom (n = 5) and 
Switzerland (n = 4). Countries from Western Europe (together with Belgium) cover a total of 
30 studies, accounting for more than a quarter (27%) of the sample. These are followed by 
Northern European countries (Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden) which cover a total 
of 8 studies (7% of the sample).  
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    Fig. 2. Number of studies by country and study design 
Our sample covers studies published from the mid-1990s onwards (Figure 3 and Table 1). 
While the number of studies has been on a downward trend, the quality of studies is 
increasing over time, on average. While experimental designs are sparsely distributed over 
time, it is clear that there is an increasing trend in the use of quasi-experimental designs 
starting from the mid-2000s. Within the field of policy intervention evaluations, 
experimental designs such as randomised controlled trials, although regarded as the ‘gold 
standard’, require a great amount of resources both in terms of funding and participant 
involvement. 
 
 
    Fig. 3. Distribution of studies by year of publication and study design 
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Table 1 Frequencies and proportion of studies by period of publication and study design 
 Non-experimental 
design 
 Quasi-experimental 
design 
 Experimental 
design 
 
Publication 
period n % 
 
n %  n % 
Total 
(n) 
     
 
  
  
1995-1999 2 3  1 4  2 17 5 
2000-2009 43 60  10 38  6 50 59 
2010-2019 26 37 15 58  4 33 45 
     
 
  
  
 71 100  26 100  12 100 109 
 
On the other hand, quasi-experimental designs are more accessible in the context of 
evaluation research of policy and social interventions as they can rely more easily on 
observational data derived from survey and administrative data sources. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of publications arranged by study design and the population 
group targeted by sanction policy interventions. A large portion (n = 56, 79%) of the studies 
using an observational design are based on interventions addressing low-income families 
and lone parents. In terms of both absolute numbers and percentages, the number of 
studies investigating low-income families or lone parents decreases both in absolute and 
percentage terms for quasi-experimental (n = 12; 46%) and experimental designs (n = 5; 
42%). Conversely, studies based on the unemployed segments of the population, tend to 
rely more on quasi-experimental (54%) and experimental study designs (58%).  
 
 
    Fig. 4. Number of studies by study design and target population 
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3.2 Developing a study design typology 
So far, we have considered a conventional three-way classification of study designs (non-
experimental, quasi-experimental and experimental designs). We refine this classification 
and develop a study design typology which emerged from the assessment of the studies 
captured in our analytical sample. Table 2 provides a brief description for each cluster or 
group and highlights some issues related to the identification of causal effects. The 
constructed typology is articulated into five types which include a range of estimation tools 
or methods which are ordered approximately according to the extent to which each method 
is suitable to address causation. 
Types 1 and 2 are non-experimental study designs. Type 1 comprises descriptive studies 
based on bivariate analysis and studies based on simple multivariable regression techniques, 
such as linear regression and logistic/probit models. These generally rely on covariate 
adjustment to account for confounders. Conventional linear and logistic regression analysis 
lie at the lower end of the continuum generally as they do not provide tools able to support 
the identification of causal effects. Type 2 includes more advanced regression-based 
approaches which, depending on how these are implemented, can claim to control for some 
unmeasured confounding. These include survival and hierarchical models, time series and 
fixed effects models.  
Types 3 and 4 are sometimes bundled together into the quasi-experimental design cluster, 
although we prefer to limit this designation to Type 4. There is an increasing recognition 
across the health and social sciences that this design group are characterised by a high 
degree of heterogenity in terms of quality of approach and the ability to address causation 
(Craig et al. 2017; Dunning, 2012). Type 3 includes designs based on matching techniques 
which rely on covariate adjustment to estimate a propensity score, that is the probability of 
an individual being assigned to an intervention. Type 4 encompasses difference-in-
differences models, regression discontinuity and instrumental variables models which rely 
on an identification strategy based on exogenous variations occurring ‘naturally’ in the 
observed data which allow to support causal claims more effectively.  
While propensity score matching and related approaches may still be affected by potential 
issues arising from both residual and unmeasured confounding, the underlying assumptions 
of the estimation approaches included in Type 4 may prove difficult to be tested which may 
raise challenges in the interpretation and attribution of effects. At the highest end of the 
continuum lie Type 5 which include randomised controlled trials which, by relying on 
random assignment to allocate individuals to treatment and control groups, are able to 
minimise sources of selection bias. 
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Table 2 Overview of the study design typology based on the studies included in the scoping 
review 
Study design typology Description Issues for identification of 
causal effects 
1. Descriptive analysis, OLS, 
logistic/probit regression 
Bivariate analyses and 
multivariable regression models 
relying on standard covariate 
adjustment to control for 
potential confounders 
 
Omission of unobserved 
confounders which correlate with 
sanction risks and relevant 
outcomes may bias estimations of 
sanction effects.  
 
2. Survival models, hierarchical 
models, time series, fixed 
effects 
 
More complex models which may 
control for some unmeasured 
confounding along with that due 
to covariates.  
 
Issues of residual confounding 
and reverse causation 
(endogeneity) may remain 
3. Propensity score matching 
 
Using selection on observables to 
estimate the probability of 
exposure or treatment 
conditioned on measured 
confounders 
 
Potential issues of residual and 
unmeasured confounding 
4. Difference-in-Differences, 
Regression discontinuity, 
Instrumental variables 
 
Using exogenous variation 
occurring ‘naturally’ in the data to 
estimate causal effect 
Rely on strong assumptions (e.g. 
time-invariant confounding, 
continuity of the assignment 
variable continuity, association of 
the instrument with the outcome 
exclusively through the treatment 
variable) which are difficult to test 
although various analyses may 
give additional support. Some 
potential issues of unmeasured 
confounding remain. 
 
5. Randomised Controlled 
Trial/Random assignment 
Exploit random assignment of 
individuals to a treatment and a 
control group to effectively 
account for sources of selection 
bias 
Considered as the gold standard 
for the identification of causal 
effects 
   
 
A large part of the evidence base on the impacts of benefit sanction (n = 74; 68%) reports 
labour market outcomes, such as welfare benefit exits and re-entry, employment status and 
transitions, duration of unemployment and earnings. Wider impacts appear in just 35 
studies (32%) (Table 3).  
Very few of the studies reporting wider impacts are of the experimental or quasi-
experimental types (just 15 per cent in Types 4 and 5). More than half (51%) are Type 1 with 
most of the rest (34%) from Type 2. For studies focussing on labour market outcomes, one 
quarter (25%) are from experimental or quasi-experimental groups. Of the remainder, the 
largest group (34%) comes from Type 2 containing more complex regression-based 
approaches but a significant number are still more basic Type 1 studies (23%).   
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Table 3 Study design typology by labour market and wider outcomes 
 Labour market 
outcomes 
 Wider 
outcomes 
 
 
Study design typology n %  n % 
Total 
(n)  
 
 
  
  
1. Descriptive analysis, OLS, 
logistic/probit regression 
19 23  18 51 37 
2. Survival models, hierarchical models, 
time series, fixed effects 
28 34  12 34 40 
3. Propensity score 
matching 
15 18  0 0 15 
4. Difference-in-Differences, Regression 
discontinuity, Instrumental variables 
9 11  3 9 12 
5. Randomised Controlled Trial/Random 
assignment 
11 14  2 6 13 
 
 
 
  
  
Total 74 100  35 100 109 
Note: Total in each column exceeds the number of studies reviewed reported here due to multiple outcomes 
in individual publications. 
Given that studies of wider impacts have had little attention in the past, we focus for the 
remainder of the paper on the 35 studies in this group. We are interested in the evidence 
they contain on the wider impacts and also, insofar as the few studies we have can support 
this, the extent to which those with more sophisticated designs reinforce the findings of 
non-experimental studies or challenge them. 
Table A3 in the Appendix provides an overview of the 35 studies reporting wider outcomes. 
All studies using quasi-experimental or experimental designs (Types 4 and 5) were from the 
US and all the studies included in Type 4 applied a difference-in-differences approach. Three 
studies focussed on child-related outcomes (Aber, Brooks-Gunn, and Maynard 1995, Fein 
and Lee 2003, Wang 2015), such as child development, well-being and maltreatment (e.g. 
foster care placement), and found no significant impacts of benefit sanctions. Two of these 
studies were based on random assignment of individuals to a control and a treatment group 
(Aber, Brooks-Gunn, and Maynard 1995, Fein and Lee 2003), while the third study by Wang 
(2015) combined a difference-in-differences model with a propensity score matching 
approach. For adult outcomes, only marginally significant increases were reported for 
school/training attendance by Aber and co-authors’ (1995) experimental study and a 
significant reduction in the number of people claiming benefits was found in a quasi-
experimental study conducted by Danielson and Klerman (2008), who applied a difference-
in-differences estimation approach. No significant impacts were reported for demographic 
outcomes such as childbearing (Aber, Brooks-Gunn, and Maynard 1995) and living 
arrangements (Acs and Nelson 2004). 
Among the studies included in Type 2 (enhanced regression models), a high proportion 
applied either fixed effect models, survival models, or a combination of the two. More than 
half of the studies focussed on child-related outcomes, such as maltreatment (Beimers and 
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Coulton 2011; Ovwigho, Leavitt, and Born 2003; Paxson and Waldfogel 2003; Slack, Lee, and 
Berger 2007), living arrangements (Dunifon, Hynes, and Peters 2009), and well-being 
(Lohman et al. 2004, Reichman, Teitler, and Curtis 2005). Benefit sanctions were found to 
have a positive association with some aspects of child maltreatment and a negative 
association with children’s well-being, while no significant associations were found with 
children’s living arrangements. Divergent associations were found for adult health 
outcomes, with a negative link reported by Davis (2019) and a positive link reported by 
Reichman and co-authors (2015). No effects of benefit sanctions were reported for 
demographic outcomes such as female headship (Fitgerald and Ribar 2004) and non-marital 
childbearing (Ryan, Manlove, and Hofferth 2006). Significant associations were found by two 
ecological studies, with a study by Snarr (2013) showing that sanctions were linked to a 
reduction of welfare caseload (number of people claiming benefits), while Reeves and 
Loopstra (2017) reported that sanctions were correlated with a higher proportions in the 
population of people with a disability and lone parents. A study by Reichman and co-authors 
(2005) showed that benefit sanctions were positively linked with various aspects of material 
hardship, such as food deprivation, utility shutoffs and housing problems. 
Among the studies included in Type 1, there is a balanced distribution among descriptive 
analyses and standard regression-based analyses using either OLS or logistic models, with 
equal numbers across the three sub-groups. Based on the US, the vast majority of studies (n 
= 13) reported heightened associations with various aspects of material hardship 
experienced by both adult and children, including financial strain, food deprivation, utility 
shutoffs, housing problems, difficulties in accessing medical care and perceived hardship. In 
an ecological study using OLS regression, Rodgers and co-authors (2006) found that harsher 
sanctions correlate with a reduction in poverty. No significant associations were reported in 
the case of adult’s mental and physical health (Casey et al. 2004; Lindhorst and Mancoske 
2006). Concerning welfare caseload, while a study by Chavkin and co-authors (2000) 
reported no significant associations with benefit sanctions, Yu (2001) revealed that 
sanctions programmes led to a significant caseload reduction. The remaining studies 
focussed on children and reported an increase in problematic outcomes concerning 
cognitive and behavioural aspects, hospitalisations, school enrolment and attendance 
(Chase-Lansdale et al 2002; Cook et al. 2002; Gritz et al 2001; Larson, Singh, and Lewis 
2001). 
4. Conclusion 
In this study we presented preliminary findings from a scoping review that was conducted to 
identify the nature of the evidence base relating to impact of benefit sanctions on both 
labour market and wider outcomes. The review applied comprehensive searching of the 
international quantitative literature and rigorous methodology in line with the PRISMA 
guidelines designed for scoping reviews (Tricco et al. 2018). From the examination of the 
studies included in the scoping review, we developed a study design typology based on the 
extent to which the modelling approaches employed provide support for the identification 
of causal effects.  
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Our scoping review identified 109 studies providing novel quantitative evidence on the 
labour market and/or wider impacts of sanctions which met our inclusion criteria. In terms 
of geographical coverage, most of the studies originated from the US, followed by Western 
and Northern European studies. While the overall volume of studies has decreased in recent 
years, an increasing proportion are using experimental or quasi-experimental study designs 
which enables stronger claims to identify causal effects. Two thirds of our sample 
investigated labour market impacts while only one third focussed on the wider impacts. Of 
these only a small number used experimental or quasi-experimental designs. The nature of 
the impacts appeared rather fragmented, encompassing a wide range of outcomes relating 
to both adults and children. In both cases, experimental and quasi-experimental designs 
reported either non-significant or marginally significant effects. The results from non-
experimental designs were highly inconsistent.  
Future developments will include an in-depth analysis and synthesis of the evidence of 
benefit sanctions on labour market outcomes which will facilitate a comparison between 
the nature of the evidence base and study design features for both labour market and wider 
outcomes. In this study, analyses did not cover other components of the analytical sample, 
such as studies based on the assessment of multiple interventions or policy tools and 
studies including both narrative and more systematic reviews. It would be useful to extend 
the analyses to both groups of studies in order to identify whether there is any variation in 
terms of patterns emerging from the evidence base and related study design approaches. 
There is also scope to extend the explorative exercise undertaken for this scoping review to 
a full-systematic review, by conducting a critical appraisal of the evidence base by means of 
a more formal synthesis using a meta-analytic approach. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Summary of search strategies and records retrieved 
Database name and coverage Interface Database 
dates 
Records 
retrieved 
ASSIA Proquest 1987- 324 
BEI (British Education Index) EBSCO 1929- 56 
EconLita EBSCO 1886- 1033 
EconLitb EBSCO 1886- 1424 
ERIC EBSCO 1966- 492 
PsycINFO EBSCO 1698- 821 
MEDLINEc OVID 1996- 534 
SCOPUS Elsevier 2004- 2365 
SocINDEX EBSCO 1908- 2580 
    
Total   9629 
    
After duplicates removed   7169 
Notes: a The searches for both this database and all the remaining unmarked databases, 
including Medline, were conducted in March 2019; b A revised search for EconLit was 
conducted in June 2019 in order to integrate the search terms relating to 
‘unemployment insurance’ which were not previously included; c No revisions from 
1996 to February Week 4 2019. 
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Table A2 Search strategies 
Search Terms 
 ASSIA 
Set 1 (noft(sanction*) OR noft(penalt*) OR noft(punishment*) OR noft(punitive) OR 
noft(monitoring) OR noft(exclusion) OR noft(leaving) OR noft(exiting)) OR noft(exit) OR 
noft(austerity) OR noft(conditionality) OR noft("welfare conditionality") OR noft 
("welfare sanction") 
Set 2 (noft(claimant*) OR noft("job seeker*") OR noft(unemployed) OR noft("welfare 
recipient*") OR noft(recipient*) OR noft(unemployment) OR noft(family) OR 
noft(families) OR noft(child*) OR noft(youth) OR noft(jobless) OR noft (sick) OR noft 
(sickness) or noft (disabled) OR noft (disability) OR noft (impaired) OR noft(incapacity) 
OR noft(parent*) OR noft(lone) OR noft(singlel)) 
Set 3 (noft("TANF") OR noft("welfare to work") OR noft("public assistance") OR 
noft("employment and support allowance") OR noft("individual re-integration 
agreement") OR noft(monetary NEAR/2 incentive) OR noft("monetary N/3 incentive") 
OR noft("monetary benefit") OR noft("social assistance") OR noft("work first strateg*") 
OR noft("incapacity benefit*") OR noft("disability living allowance") OR noft("Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act") OR noft("Active labo?r market 
polic*") OR noft("Active labo?r market program*") OR noft("agenda 2010") OR 
noft("domestic purposes benefit") OR noft("america works") OR noft("cash benefit*") 
OR noft("cash incentive") OR "government intervention*" OR noft("government 
program*") OR noft("income benefit*") OR noft("income supplement*") OR noft("job 
seeker*") OR noft("job seekers allowance") OR noft("public welfare reform*") OR 
noft("tax credit*") OR noft("universal credit") OR noft("financial benefit*") OR 
noft("conditional benefit*") OR noft("work program*") OR noft("social security 
reform*") OR noft("claimant*") OR noft("welfare reform*") OR noft("benefit cap") OR 
noft("welfare conditionality") OR noft("social protection scheme*") OR noft("temporary 
assistance to needy families")) 
Set 4 All sets combined 
  
 EBSCO – for all databases 
S1 "help to work program" 
S2 "canada health and social transfer" 
S3 "Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act" 
S4 "Active labo?r market polic*" 
S5 Active labo?r market program* OR active labo?r participation 
S6 "Agenda 2010" 
S7 "domestic purposes benefit" 
S8 "America works" 
S9 cash benefit* 
S10 cash incentives 
S11 "government intervention*" 
S12 "government program*" 
S13 "income benefit" 
S14 "income support" 
S15 "income supplement*" 
S16 "job seeker allowance*" 
S17 "public welfare reform*" 
S18 "tax credit" 
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Table A2 (Continued) 
Search Terms 
S19 "universal credit" 
S20 "financial benefit*" 
S21 "conditional benefits" 
S22 "work program*" 
S23 "social security reform*" 
S24 "welfare reform*" 
S25 "benefit cap" 
S26 welfare conditionality 
S27 ((DE "PUBLIC welfare policy") OR (DE "WELFARE recipients")) OR (DE "WELFARE state") 
S28 "public assistance" 
S29 DE "SOCIAL security" 
S30 "social protection scheme" 
S31 "Temporary Assistance to Needy Families" OR tanf 
S32 "welfare to work" 
S33 "Employment and Support Allowance" 
S34 hilfe zum arbeit OR hilfe zum lebensunterhalt 
S35 "individual re-integration agreement" 
S36 monetary N3 incentive 
S37 "monetary benefit*" 
S38 "social assistance" 
S39 "work first strateg*" 
S40 "disability living allowance" 
S41 basic income 
S42 welfare funds 
S43 ontario works 
S44 mandatory employment 
S45 new start allowance 
S46 jobbskatteavdraget 
S47 workfare 
S48 disability benefit* 
S49 incapacity benefit* 
S50 S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR S4 OR S5 OR S6 OR S7 OR S8 OR S9 OR S10 OR S11 OR S12 OR S13 OR 
S14 OR S15 OR S16 OR S17 OR S18 OR S19 OR S20 OR S21 OR S22 OR S23 OR S24 OR S25 
OR S26 OR S27 OR S28 OR S29 OR S30 OR S31 OR S32 OR S33 OR S34 OR S35 OR S36 OR 
S37 OR S38 OR S39 OR S40 OR S41 OR S42 OR S43 OR S44 OR S45 OR S46 OR S47 OR S48 
OR S49 
S51 sanction* 
S52 penalt* 
S53 punishment* 
S54 punitive 
S55 welfare conditionality 
S56 "welfare sanction" 
S57 austerity 
S58 exclusion OR exit* OR leaving or loss 
S59 monitoring 
S60 S51 OR S52 OR S53 OR S54 OR S55 OR S56 OR S57 OR S58 OR S59 
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Table A2 (Continued) 
Search Terms 
S61 claimant* or parent* or family or families or child* or youth or lone or single or disabled 
or disability or impaired or incapacity or sick or sickness 
S62 job seeker* 
S63 jobless* 
S64 recipient* 
S65 "welfare recipient" 
S66 unemployed or unemployment 
S67 S61 OR S62 OR S63 OR S64 OR S65 OR S66 
  
 Medline 
1 "welfare benefits".ab,ti. 
2 help to work program.ab,ti. 
3 (canada health and social transfer).ab,ti. 
4 (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act).ab,ti. 
5 "Active labo?r market polic*".ab,ti. 
6 labo?r force participation.ab,ti. 
7 "Active labo?r market program*".ab,ti. 
8 Agenda 2010.ab,ti. 
9 domestic purposes benefit.ab,ti. 
10 america works.ab,ti.  
11 cash benefit.ab,ti. 
12 cash incentive.ab,ti. 
13 government intervention.ab,ti. 
14 "Government program*".ab,ti. 
15 "income benefit*".ab,ti. 
16 income support.ab,ti. 
17 income supplement.ab,ti. 
18 job seeker allowance.ab,ti. 
19 "public welfare reform*".ab,ti. 
20 "tax credit*".ab,ti. 
21 basic income.ab,ti. 
22 universal credit.ab,ti. 
23 financial benefit*.ab,ti. 
24 conditional benefits.ab,ti. 
25 "work program*".ab,ti. 
26 social security reform*.ab,ti.  
27 "welfare reform*".ab,ti. 
28 welfare fund.ab,ti. 
29 benefit cap.ab,ti. 
30 welfare conditionality.ab,ti. 
31 Social Welfare/ 
32 public assistance/ 
33 Social Security/ 
34 "social protection scheme*".ab,ti. 
35 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.ab,ti. 
36 TANF.ab,ti. 
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Table A2 (Continued) 
Search Terms 
37 welfare to work.ab,ti. 
38 public assistance.ti,ab. 
39 (Employment and Support Allowance).ab,ti. 
40 hilfe zum arbeit.ab,ti. 
41 hilfe zum lebensunterhalt.ab,ti. 
42 revenu minimum d'insertion.ab,ti. 
43 individual re-integration agreement.ab,ti. 
44 (monetary adj 2 incentive*).ab,ti. 
45 "monetary benefit*".ab,ti. 
46 monetary support.ab,ti. 
47 social assistance.ab,ti. 
48 "work first strateg*".ab,ti. 
49 "incapacity benefit*".ab,ti. 
50 disability living allowance.ab,ti. 
51 disability benefit*.ab,ti. 
52 workfare.ab,ti. 
53 new start allowance.ab,ti. 
54 jobbskatteavdraget.ab,ti. 
55 mandatory employment.ab,ti. 
56 Ontario works.ab,ti. 
57 "sanction*".ab,ti. 
58 "penalt*".ab,ti. 
59 "punishment*".ab,ti. 
60 punitive.ab,ti. 
61 welfare conditionality.ab,ti. 
62 conditionality.ab,ti. 
63 "welfare sanction*".ab,ti. 
64 austerity.ab,ti. 
65 loss.ab,ti. 
66 exclusion.ab,ti. 
67 exit*.ab,ti. 
68 monitoring.ab,ti. 
69 leaving.ab,ti. 
70 "job seeker*".ab,ti. 
71 jobless.ab,ti. 
72 "recipient*".ab,ti. 
73 "welfare recipient*".ab,ti. 
74 unemployed.ab,ti. 
75 unemployment.ab,ti. 
76 (claimant* or parent* or family or families or child* or youth or lone or single or disabled 
or disability or impaired or incapacity or sick or sickness).ab,ti. 
77 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 
18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 
or 34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 
49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 54 or 55 or 56 
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Table A2 (Continued) 
Search Terms 
78 57 or 58 or 59 or 60 or 61 or 62 or 63 or 64 or 65 or 66 or 67 or 68 or 69 
79 70 or 71 or 72 or 73 or 74 or 75 or 76 
80 77 and 78 and 79 
  
 SCOPUS 
1 ( ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Ontario Works" )  OR  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "welfare benefits" )  OR  
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "exit to work" )  OR  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "unemployment insurance" )  OR  
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Help to work program*" ) )  OR  ( "Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Active labo?r market polic*" ) )  
OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( active  AND  labo?r  AND  market  AND  program* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-
ABS-KEY ( "Agenda 2010" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "le new deal" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( 
labo?r  AND  force  AND  participation )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "domestic purposes 
benefit" ) ) )  OR  ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "America works" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( cash  AND  
benefit* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( cash  AND  incentive* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( 
"government intervention*" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "government program*" ) )  OR  ( 
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "income benefit" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "income support" ) )  OR  ( 
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "income supplement*" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "job seeker allowance*" 
) ) )  OR  ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "tax credit" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "universal credit" ) )  OR  
( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "financial benefit*" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "conditional benefits" ) )  
OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "work program*" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( workfare ) )  OR  ( TITLE-
ABS-KEY ( "social security reform*" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "welfare reform*" ) )  OR  ( 
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "benefit cap" ) ) )  OR  ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( welfare  AND  conditionality ) )  
OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "public assistance" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "social protection 
scheme" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Temporary Assistance to Needy Families"  OR  tanf ) )  
OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "welfare to work" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Employment and 
Support Allowance" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( hilfe  AND  zum  AND  arbeit  OR  hilfe  AND  
zum  AND  lebensunterhalt ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "individual re-integration 
agreement" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "monetary benefit*" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( 
"monetary incentive*" ) ) )  OR  ( ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "social assistance" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-
KEY ( "work first strateg*" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "incapacity benefit" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-
ABS-KEY ( "disability living allowance" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Canada health and social 
transfer" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "Active labo?r force prticipation)) or (TITLE-ABS-
KEY(public welfare reform*)) or (TITLE-ABS-KEY(basic income)) or (TITLE-ABS-KEY(welfare 
fund*)) (TITLE-ABS-KEY("  revenue  AND  minimum  AND  d'insertion  ")) or (TITLE-ABS-
KEY("  monetary  AND  support  ")) or (TITLE-ABS-KEY("  disability  AND  living  AND  
allowance* ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "disability benefit" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "new 
start allowance" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "jobbskatteavdraget" ) )  OR  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( 
"mandatory employment" ) ) ) ) 
2 AND  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( impaired  OR  incapacity  OR  parent*  OR  lone  OR  single  OR  
sickness  OR  sick  OR  family  OR  families  OR  child*  OR  youth  OR  claimant*  OR  "job 
seeker"  OR  unemployment  OR  unemployed  OR  "welfare recipient*"  OR  jobless*  OR  
recipient*  OR  disability  OR  disabled ) ) 
3 AND  ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( sanction*  OR  punishment*  OR  penalt*  OR  punitive  OR  exit*  
OR  monitoring  OR  leaving  OR  exclusion  OR  austerity  OR  loss  OR  conditionality  OR  
"welfare conditionality"  OR  "welfare sanction" ) ) 
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Table A2 (Continued) 
Search Terms 
 EconLit (revised search conducted in June 2019) 
S1 "help to work program" 
S2 "canada health and social transfer" 
S3 "Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act" 
S4 "Active labo?r market polic*" 
S5 "Agenda 2010" 
S6 "domestic purposes benefit" 
S7 "America works" 
S8 "cash benefit*" 
S9 "cash incentive*" 
S10 "government intervention*" 
S11 "government program*" 
S12 "income benefit*" 
S13 "income support" 
S14 "income supplement*" 
S15 "job seeker allowance*" 
S16 "public welfare reform*" 
S17 "tax credit*" 
S18 "universal credit" 
S19 "financial benefit*" 
S20 "conditional benefits" 
S21 "work program*" 
S22 "welfare reform*" 
S23 "benefit cap" 
S24 "welfare conditionality" 
S25 "Temporary Assistance to Needy Families" OR "TANF" 
S26 "welfare to work" 
S27 "Employment and Support Allowance" 
S28 hilfe zum arbeit OR hilfe zum lebensunterhalt 
S29 "individual re-integration agreement" 
S30 "monetary benefit*" 
S31 "social assistance" 
S32 "work first strateg*" 
S33 "disability living allowance" 
S34 "basic income" 
S35 "basic income guarantee" 
S36 "ontario works" 
S37 "mandatory employment" 
S38 "new start allowance" 
S39 jobbskatteavdraget 
S40 workfare 
S41 "disability benefit*" 
S42 "incapacity benefit*" 
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Table A2 (Continued) 
Search Terms 
S43 S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR S4 OR S5 OR S6 OR S7 OR S8 OR S9 OR S10 OR S11 OR S12 OR S13 OR 
S14 OR S15 OR S16 OR S17 OR S18 OR S19 OR S20 OR S21 OR S22 OR S23 OR S24 OR S25 
OR S26 OR S27 OR S28 OR S29 OR S30 OR S31 OR S32 OR S33 OR S34 OR S35 OR S36 OR 
S37 OR S38 OR S39 OR S40 OR S41 OR S42 
S44 (ZU "unemployment insurance") or (ZU "unemployment insurance; severance pay; plant 
closings") or (ZU "unemployment assistance") 
S45 (ZU "welfare, well-being, and poverty: government programs; provision and effects of 
welfare programs" OR ZU "social security")) 
S46 S44 OR S45 
S47 S43 OR S46 
S48 AB sanctions* OR TI sanction* 
S49 AB penalt* OR TI penalt 
S50 AB punishment* OR TI punishment* 
S51 AB punitive OR TI punitive 
S52 AB conditionality OR TI conditionality 
S53 AB austerity OR TI austerity 
S54 TI exclusion OR AB exclusion 
S55 AB exit* AND TI exit* 
S56 AB leaving OR TI leaving 
S57 AB loss AND TI loss 
S58 TI monitoring OR AB monitoring 
S59 S48 OR S49 OR S50 OR S51 OR S52 OR S53 OR S54 OR S55 OR S56 OR S57 OR S58 
S60 S47 OR S59 
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Table A3 Overview of studies on the wider impacts of benefit sanctions included in the sample 
 
 
No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
 
Study design typology - Type 5: Randomised controlled trial, randomised assignment (Experimental design) 
1 Aber, Brooks-
Gunn, and 
Maynard 
(1995) 
USA  
(three cities, 
Illinois and 
New Jersey) 
Lone parents 
(teenage 
parents with 
one child) 
Outcomes:  
Adult outcomes:  
School attendance 
Childbearing 
Parent/child outcomes:  
Parenting behaviour 
Child development 
 
Exposure:  
Loss of mother’s 
component of  
welfare benefit 
Experimental 
(random 
assignment) 
Findings: 
Adult: Attendance at school/job 
training increased. 
Parent/child: No reduction in 
further childbearing or change in 
parenting behaviour or child 
development.  
“The evaluation results suggest 
that supportive, mandatory 
welfare-to-work interventions 
need not harm parents or their 
children in the short term, and 
that their modest positive effects 
on the financial independence of 
the teenage mothers may yield 
long-term rewards” (p. 53). 
 
Time horizon: Short term. 
 
Linked 
survey-
admini- 
strative 
data 
(various 
sources) 
Adults: 4559 
(admin data 
outcomes); 
3867  
(survey 
outcomes). 
Parenting/c
hild:  
182 
(mother-
child pairs at 
one site) 
n/a n/a 
2 Fein and Lee 
(2003) 
USA 
(Delaware) 
 
Lone parents Outcomes:  
Child outcomes: 
child maltreatment 
(neglect, physical and 
emotional abuse) 
 
Exposure:  
Partial to full benefit 
sanctions 
 
Experimental 
(random 
assignment) 
Findings: 
“Results show small increases in 
child neglect but no effects on 
physical abuse, sexual abuse, or 
foster care placement” (p. 83). 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Linked 
survey-
admini- 
strative 
data 
(various 
sources) 
3959 Control group 
had significant 
lower rates of 
work 
participation, 
experience of 
any sanctions 
and full 
sanctions. 
 
n/a 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months).  
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Table A3 Continued 
 
 
No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
 
Study design typology - Type 4: Difference-in-Differences, Regression discontinuity, Instrumental variables (Quasi-experimental design) 
3 Acs and 
Nelson (2004) 
USA 
(13 states) 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Demographic outcomes: 
Dual versus single 
parenting) 
 
Exposure:  
Full-family sanctions 
 
Quasi-
experimental 
(Difference-in-
difference-in-
differences) 
Findings: 
 “Sanctions […] have no clear 
consistent association with living 
arrangements” (p. 273). 
 
Time horizon: Short/medium 
term. 
National 
Surveys of 
America’s 
Families 
(NSAF)  
1997, 1999 
 
n/a Same states but 
less poor or 
slightly better 
educated 
Yes 
4 Danielson and 
Klerman 
(2008) 
USA 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Welfare caseload  
(all benefit recipients) 
 
Exposure:  
Gradual full-family 
sanctions 
Quasi-
experimental 
(Difference-in-
differences 
with Fixed 
Effects) 
Findings: 
The state-level introduction of 
full-family sanction policies 
reduces the welfare caseload 
three years after implementation. 
 
Time horizon: Long term. 
Admini- 
strative 
data 
Welfare 
Rules 
Database 
1990-2005 
 
9359 n/a Yes 
5 Wang 
(2015) 
USA 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Child outcomes: 
Child well-being 
(educational outcomes) 
 
Exposure: Gradual full-
family sanctions 
Quasi-
experimental 
(Difference-in-
differences; 
Propensity 
Score 
Matching) 
Findings: 
“Neither state TANF policy 
stringencies nor income and 
employment changes show 
significant differential influence 
on TANF's impact on child well-
being” (p. 121). 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Survey of 
Income and 
Program 
Participation 
(SIPP),  
2004 and 
2008 panels 
4163 Children not 
covered by TANF 
welfare policy 
tended to be 
from a white 
ethnic group, 
with a younger/ 
less-educated 
guardian/parent 
Yes 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months).  
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Table A3 Continued 
 
 
No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
 
Study design typology – Type 2: Survival models, hierarchical models, time series, fixed effects (Non-experimental 2) 
6 Beimers and 
Coulton 
(2011) 
USA 
(Ohio) 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Child outcome: 
Child maltreatment 
 
Exposure: Involuntary exit 
from welfare 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Survival 
model 
Findings: 
 “Families with an involuntary exit 
from TANF were at increased risk 
of a substantiated or indicated 
finding of maltreatment" (p. 1112). 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Linked 
admini- 
strative 
data 
 
18000 n/a n/a 
7 Davis (2019) 
USA 
Lone parents 
(low-educated 
single mothers) 
Outcomes: Mental health 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
(at state level) 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Fixed effects 
and Random 
effects 
models) 
 
Findings: 
States that have harsher sanctions 
have worse mental health among 
low-educated single mothers. 
 
Time horizon: Short term. 
 
Linked 
admini- 
strative 
data 
 
233716 Mothers 
(excluded single 
mothers) who 
did not 
graduate from 
high school 
Yes 
8 Dunifon, 
Hynes, and 
Peters (2009) 
USA 
Low-income 
families/lone 
parents 
Outcomes: Child 
outcomes (living 
arrangements) 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
(at state level) 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Multinomial 
logistic 
regression 
with fixed 
effects) 
 
Findings: 
State-level sanctions policies are 
not shown to affect children’s living 
arrangements. 
 
Time horizon: Short/medium term. 
 
Linked 
data: 
Survey of 
Income and 
Programme 
Participa-
tion (SIPP) 
1992, 1993, 
and 1996; 
Welfare 
Rules 
Database 
 
45847 n/a Yes 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months).  
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Table A3 Continued 
 
 
No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
9 Fitzgerald, J. 
M. and Ribar, 
D. C. (2004) 
USA 
Low-income 
families/lone 
parents 
Outcomes: Demographic 
outcomes (Female 
headship) 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
(at state level) 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Survival 
model) 
Findings: 
State-level sanctions policies are 
not shown to affect female 
headship. 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Linked 
data: 
Survey of 
Income and 
Programme 
Participatio
n (SIPP) 
1990, 1992, 
1993, and 
1996; 
Welfare 
Rules 
Database 
By female 
headship-
related 
outomes: 
 
654327 
(level) 
13822 
(exits) 
52839 
(entry) 
n/a Yes 
10 Lohman et al. 
(2004) 
USA 
(Boston, 
Chicago, San 
Antonio) 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Child outcomes:  
Quantitative/reading skills,  
behavioural problems 
 
Exposure: Partial or full 
benefit sanction 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Hierarchical 
model) 
Findings: 
“Results show that while sanctions 
are not linked to adolescents’ 
outcomes, there is a negative link 
between sanctions and young 
children’s well-being [in terms of 
lower cognitive achievement and 
serious behavioural problems]” (p. 
67).  
 
Time horizon:  
Short/medium term. 
 
Survey 
data: 
Welfare, 
Children, 
and 
Families: 
Three-City 
Study, 
1999 
1885 n/a No 
11 Ovwigho, 
Leavitt, and 
Born (2003) 
USA 
(Maryland) 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Child maltreatment 
 
Exposure: Involuntary exit 
from welfare due to 
sanctions 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Survival 
model) 
Findings: 
Those exiting welfare due to 
sanctions have significantly higher 
maltreatment rates than almost all 
other groups  
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
Linked 
admini- 
strative 
data 
 
17440 
children in 
8900 
families 
n/a n/a 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months).  
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Table A3 Continued 
 
 
No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
12 Paxson and 
Waldfogel 
(2003) 
USA 
 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Child outcome: 
Child maltreatment 
(Reports of child 
maltreatments,  
Cases of abuse/neglect, 
Children in foster care 
 
Exposure: Full-family 
sanctions 
(at state-level) 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Fixed effects 
models) 
Findings: 
Sanctions are positively and 
significantly related to the number 
of children placed in foster care, 
but are not related to the other 
maltreatment measures. 
 
Time horizon:  
Short/medium term. 
 
State-
level 
admini-
strative 
and 
survey 
data:  
(various 
sources) 
1990-
1998 
49 n/a Yes 
13 Reeves and 
Loopstra 
(2017) 
UK 
(Great 
Britain) 
Unemployed Outcomes:  
Persons with disability, 
Lone parents 
 
Exposure: Proportion of 
benefit claimants who 
received a sanction (local-
authority level) 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Fixed effects 
models) 
Findings: 
“Sanction rates appear to be higher 
in areas where there are more 
disabled and lone parent JSA 
claimants. […] Conditionality 
appears to disadvantage those with 
ill health, physical limitations, or 
uncertain family commitments” (p. 
335).  
 
Time horizon: n/a. 
 
Area-level 
administr
ative and 
survey 
data 
(various 
sources) 
2008/09-
2014/15 
175 n/a 
 
Yes 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months).  
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Table A3 Continued 
 
 
No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
14 Reichman, 
Teitler, and 
Curtis (2005) 
USA 
Lone parents Outcomes: 
Material hardship 
(maternal/child hunger, 
homelessness/eviction, 
utility shutoffs, 
lack of medical care, 
any of above hardships, 
received financial support 
from family/ friends, 
moved in with family/ 
friends) 
Mother’s physical and 
mental health: 
(Depression/anxiety, 
Self-reported physical 
health) 
Child’s physical health: 
(reported by mother) 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
Non-
experimental 
(Logistic 
regression 
models with 
fixed effects) 
Findings: 
Benefit sanctions have a significant 
positive association with hunger, 
utility shutoffs, material hardship, 
poor maternal physical health, and 
relying on others for housing. 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Fragile 
Families 
and Child 
Wellbeing 
Survey,  
1998-
2000 
821 Non-sanctioned 
mothers 
Yes 
15 Ryan, 
Manlove, and 
Hofferth 
(2006) 
USA 
Lone parents Outcomes: 
Demographic outcome: 
Nonmarital childbearing 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
(at state-level) 
Non-
experimental 
(Survival 
model with 
fixed effects) 
Findings: 
“[…] Sanction policies […] do not 
have any influence on women’s 
childbearing behaviors […], net of 
women’s individual characteristics 
and state economic environments.” 
(p. 103). 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Panel 
Study of 
Income 
Dynamics 
(PSID),  
1989-
1996 
458 Lone mothers 
who had no 
subsequent 
nonmarital 
birth tended to 
live in states 
with lower 
unemployment 
rates and 
higher median 
incomes 
compared to 
their 
counterparts 
Yes 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months).  
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Table A3 Continued 
 
 
No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
16 Slack, Lee, 
and Berger 
(2007) 
USA 
(Illinois) 
Lone parents Outcomes: 
Child outcomes: 
Child maltreatments 
(Reports of child neglect 
and abuse; 
Indicated reports of 
maltreatments) 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
(at state-level) 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Survival 
model with 
fixed effects) 
Findings: 
“Receipt of […] sanctions increases 
the rate of having an investigation 
for neglect but does not bear a 
statistically significant relation to 
having an indicated report of 
neglect or abuse” (p.207). 
 
Time horizon: n/a. 
 
Linked 
data: 
Illinois 
Family 
Study (IFS) 
1999-
2000 
Admin 
data 
(various 
sources) 
1260 n/a 
 
n/a 
17 Snarr 
(2013) 
USA 
 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes: 
Material hardship: 
Welfare caseload 
 
Exposure:  
Full-family sanctions 
(at state-level) 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Three-Stage 
Least Squares) 
Findings: 
“Results indicate that welfare 
reform in general is the primary 
driver of the marked reduction in 
state caseloads between its peak in 
1994 to 2005. The largest total 
effect is associated with full 
sanctions” (p.207). 
 
Time horizon: n/a. 
Various 
sources, 
1990-
2005 
n/a n/a Yes 
Study design typology - Type 1: Descriptive analysis, OLS, logistic/probit regression (Non-experimental design 1) 
18 Ala-
Kauhaluoma 
and Parpo 
(2012) 
Finland 
Long-term 
unemployed, 
young 
unemployed 
Outcomes: 
Self-performance and 
quality of life 
 
Exposure:  
Activation measures 
Non-
experimental 
(OLS 
regression) 
Findings: 
 “The activation plan […] seems to 
have no clear impact on self-
performance" (p. 387) 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
Survey 
data 
~ 2000 Unemployed 
people on 
waiting lists for 
activation 
measures 
n/a 
19 Casey et al. 
(2004) 
USA 
Lone parents Outcomes:  
Mental health 
(self-reported) 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
Non-
experimental 
(Logistic 
regression) 
Findings: 
Benefit sanctions have no 
significant association with 
maternal depression. 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
Children’s 
Sentinel 
Nutritional 
Assessment 
Program, 
2000-2001 
5306 Benefit 
claimants 
whose benefits 
were not 
decreased 
No 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months). 
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No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
 
Study design typology - Type 1: Descriptive analysis, OLS, logistic/probit regression (Non-experimental design 1) 
20 Chase-
Lansdale et 
al. (2002) 
USA 
(Boston, 
Chicago, and 
San Antonio) 
 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Child well-being: 
cognitive achievement, 
emotional/behavioural 
problems 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
Non-
experimental 
(Descriptive-
survey 
frequencies) 
Findings: 
Pre-schoolers and adolescents in 
sanctioned families showed 
problematic cognitive and 
behavioural outcomes. 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Survey 
data: 
Children 
and 
Welfare: a 
three-city 
study, 
1999 
1885 Claimants/rece
nt leavers who 
have not been 
sanctioned 
No 
21 Chavkin, 
Romero, 
and Wise 
(2000) 
USA 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes: Welfare 
caseload 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
(at state level) 
 
Non-
experimental 
(OLS 
regression) 
Findings: 
State-level sanctions policies are 
not shown to be associated with 
welfare caseload 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Linked 
admin-
survey 
data: 
various 
sources, 
1995-
1998 
50 n/a Yes 
22 Cherlin et al. 
(2002) 
USA 
(Boston, 
Chicago, and 
San Antonio) 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Material hardship 
(various indicators) 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
 
Non-
experimental 
(OLS 
regression) 
Findings: 
“[…] Families that loose benefits 
tend to cut spending and rely 
mainly on friends and kin for 
support” (pp. 400-401) 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Survey 
data: 
Children 
and 
Welfare: a 
three-city 
study, 
1999 
1262 n/a No 
23 Cook et al. 
(2002) 
USA 
(6 cities) 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Child outcomes: 
food security, health 
(lifetime hospitalisations, 
emergency department 
admissions) 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
Non-
experimental 
(Logistic 
regression) 
Findings: 
Benefit sanctions are associated 
with a significant greater increase 
in the likelihood that young 
children will experience food 
insecurity and hospitalisations. 
 
Time horizon: Medium term. 
 
Survey 
data: 
Children’s 
Sentinel 
Nutritional 
Assessment 
Program,  
1998-
2000 
2718 Comparable 
households 
who had not 
been 
sanctioned 
No 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months).  
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No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
24 Eardley 
(2006) 
Australia 
Unemployed Outcomes:  
Compliance with 
requirements; 
Material hardship: 
Living expenses 
problems, 
housing problems, 
Borrowing/debt; 
Health; 
Social relationships 
Problems; 
Risk-taking behaviour 
 
Exposure: benefit 
sanctions 
 
Non-
experimental 
(OLS and 
logistic 
regression) 
Findings: 
Sanctions lead to greater 
compliance with requirements but 
negative effects are nevertheless 
widespread, including impacts on 
living expenses, reliance on 
friends/family for support, housing 
problems, health impacts and risk-
taking activities. 
 
Time horizon: Short term. 
 
Survey 
data: 
Telephone 
survey, 
2002 
1005 n/a n/a 
25 Gritz et al. 
(2001) 
USA  
(California) 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Adult outcomes:  
Health insurance, 
housing conditions,  
stable child care, 
substance abuse 
Child outcome: 
Child risk behaviours,  
 
Exposure: Welfare leavers 
 
Non-
experimental 
(descriptive 
analysis) 
Findings: 
“The transition to child-only group 
[mainly leavers through sanctions] 
shows much less improvement 
than leavers and the informally 
diverted [i.e. other leavers] (p. xi)”. 
Worse on wide range of outcomes. 
 
Time horizon:  
Short/medium term. 
Follow-up 
surveys of 
welfare 
leavers 
~ 650 Voluntary 
welfare leavers 
n/a 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months). 
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No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
26 Hunter and 
Santhiveeran 
(2005) 
USA 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Material hardship:  
Food deprivation, 
financial hardship, 
inability to pay 
rent/utility bills 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Descriptive 
analysis) 
Findings: 
“Voluntary leavers tended to 
experience housing related 
hardships more than involuntary 
leavers did. The majority of TANF 
leavers […] reported worrying 
about food, which was ranked as 
the number one hardship. When 
compared to White leavers, other 
ethnic groups experienced a higher 
percentage of housing and 
healthcare-related hardships" (p. 
1). 
 
Time horizon: n/a. 
 
Survey 
data: 
National 
Survey of 
America's 
Families 
(NSAF), 
1999 
220 n/a n/a 
27 Kalil, Seefeldt, 
and Wang 
(2002) 
USA 
(Michigan) 
 
Lone parents Outcomes:  
Material hardship:  
Utility cut-off, 
had at least one hardship 
experience,  
expected hardship in the 
next 2 months 
 
Exposure: Partial or full 
benefit sanction 
Non-
experimental 
(Logistic 
regression) 
Findings: 
Sanctions are associated with utility 
shutoffs, engaging in hardship-
related activities, and subjective 
perceptions of material hardships 
 
Time horizon: medium term 
 
Survey 
data: 
Women's 
Employ-
ment 
Survey, 
1997,  
1998 and 
1999 
562 Non-sanctioned 
single mothers 
were more 
likely to be 
cohabiting, non 
African 
American, 
younger and 
more highly 
educated 
No 
28 Larson, Singh, 
and Lewis 
(2011) 
USA 
(Minnesota) 
 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Child outcomes: 
Education, 
enrolment disruptions 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Descriptive 
analysis) 
Findings: 
“Children from families with at 
least one sanction had lower mean 
attendance and significantly more 
disruptions to their school 
enrollment" (p. 194). 
 
Time horizon:  
Short/medium term 
Linked 
admini- 
strative 
data 
(various 
sources) 
19381 School-aged 
children in non-
sanctioned low-
income families 
were more likely 
to be white and 
in elementary 
school 
n/a 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months).  
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No. 
 
Author (year) 
Country 
 
Target 
population 
 
Wider outcomes and 
exposure 
 
Study design 
(method) 
 
Key findings and 
time horizon of effectsa 
 
Data 
source 
 
Sample 
size 
Comparator/ 
control group 
(characteristics) 
Inclusion of 
contextual 
indicators 
29 Lee, Slack, 
and Lewis 
(2004) 
USA  
(Illinois) 
Lone parents Outcomes:  
Material hardship:  
Rent, utility, food, 
perceived overall 
hardship 
 
Exposure: Partial to full 
benefit sanctions 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Logistic 
regression) 
Findings: 
“The findings show that TANF grant 
loss in general is associated with 
increased levels of hardship. 
Sanctions have a particularly strong 
relation to increased food hardships, 
while other types of grant loss are 
associated to a statistically 
significant degree with increased 
rent and utility hardships, and with 
perceived hardship" (p. 394). 
Time horizon: Short term. 
Linked 
data: Illinois 
Family 
Study (IFS), 
1999/2000, 
2001, 2002; 
Admin data 
from Illinois 
Dept. of 
Employ-
ment 
Security 
921 n/a No 
30 Lindhorst, 
Mancoske, 
and Kemp 
(2000) 
USA 
(Southern 
metropolitan 
region) 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Material hardship:  
Various conditions, 
total number of problems 
 
Exposure: Full-family 
sanctions 
 
Non-
experimental 
(descriptive 
analysis) 
Findings: 
Sanctioned families report an 
increase in the overall number of 
problems they are experiencing […]. 
Compared to those who left 
voluntarily, those who were 
sanctioned off welfare were 
significantly different in terms of 
having unmet medical needs, going 
without food, and having their 
utilities turned off (p. 198)”.  
Time horizon: Medium term. 
Survey 
data: 
Survey 
conducted 
by authors, 
1998 
347 Not sanctioned 
welfare leavers 
tend to be 
younger and 
have less 
number of 
problems 
No 
31 Lindhorst and 
Mancoske 
(2006) 
USA  
(Louisiana) 
Lone parents Outcomes:  
Material hardship:  
Food deprivation, 
housing problems, 
lacking medical care,  
no Medicaid receipt; 
Physical and mental health: 
Depression, 
Poor physical health 
Exposure: Sanctioned 
welfare leavers 
Non-
experimental 
(descriptive 
analysis) 
Findings: 
“Sanction leavers […] reported the 
highest levels of food and housing 
problems [and had difficulties in 
accessing medical resources], 
compared to TANF recipients (p. 
9)”.  
 
Time horizon:  
Short/medium term. 
 
Panel Study 
of Welfare 
Recipients, 
1998-2001 
277 n/a No 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months).  
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32 Livermore 
et al. (2015) 
USA 
(Louisiana) 
 
Lone parents Outcomes:  
Material hardship:  
Food deprivation; 
Utility shut off; 
Housing problems 
(eviction/homelessness) 
Exposure: Sanctioned 
welfare leavers 
Non-
experimental 
(Logistic 
regression) 
Findings: 
Those experiencing a sanction were 
more likely to experience material 
hardship.  
 
Time horizon:  
Medium term. 
 
Survey data 
collected by 
authors, 
2007; 
Admin data 
(various 
sources) 
459 
 
n/a No 
33 Oggins and 
Fleming 
(2001) 
USA 
(New York) 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Material hardship:  
Various indicators 
 
Exposure: Benefit 
sanctions 
 
Non-
experimental 
(Logistic 
regression) 
Findings: 
After being sanctioned, respondents 
noted greater hardship paying for 
adult health care, bills and rent; a 
greater likelihood of moving due to 
lack of rent; and less likelihood of 
having a phone-conditions that could 
make it even harder to work” (p. 
116). 
Time horizon: n/a. 
Survey 
conducted 
by authors, 
1997 and 
1999 
118 n/a No 
34 Rodgers, 
Payne, and 
Chervachidze 
(2006) 
USA 
 
Low-income 
families 
Outcomes:  
Material hardship:  
Poverty rate 
 
Exposure:  
Weak, moderate, strong 
sanctions  
(at state-level) 
Non-
experimental 
(OLS 
regression) 
Findings: 
“The evidence seems to suggest that 
tougher sanctions do tend to be 
effective in reducing poverty” (p. 
674). 
 
Time horizon: n/a. 
 
Various 
sources, 
2003 
n/a n/a Yes 
35 Yu (2001) 
USA 
Low-income 
families 
 
Outcomes:  
Material hardship:  
Welfare caseload 
 
Exposure:  
Percentage of welfare 
recipients experiencing 
benefit reductions 
(at state-level) 
Non-
experimental 
(OLS 
regression) 
Findings: 
There is a significant negative 
relationship between sanction 
programmes and welfare caseload. 
 
Time horizon: n/a. 
 
Various 
sources 
n/a n/a Yes 
Note: a Time horizon of effects is classified as: Short-term (<6 months); Medium term (6-35 months), Long term (36+ months). 
